Abelard on Universals
Abelard on Universals
By Alexander Koudlai
In
this essay I shall attempt to show that in the XII century there was a problem
of relation of names to things and classes of things, or the problem of
Universals. I shall also argue that Peter Abelard in his examination of the
problem was neither a nominalist (contrary to J. R. Weinberg’s claim in his Short
History of Medieval Philosophy, p.79), no a realist in the full meaning of
the terms, but rather synthesized both positions showing the limitations of
each of them, and presented his solution named conceptualism. I shall try to
support my own impression that (contrary to the opinion expressed by D.E.L. in
the Britanica I, p. 26) he was not exactly a peripatetic but also was
influenced by Plato and in that was also inclined to a synthesis with qualifications.
And finally I shall go in some more details of the paradox of why some scholars
like Weinberg called Abelard’s solution nominalistic.
I
It
is not just Weinberg who call’s Abelard’s solution a nominalistic.
Professor A. Broadie also thinks that “in the dispute about the nature of the
universals Abelard was in the nominalistic camp” (The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy, p. 1). For this reason, arguing against this, I would emphasize
that: 1. Abelard was well known as a knight in his debates. He was born a
son of a knight in Brittany (a relative of the Duke), and this heredity showed
in the manner of his philosophic and theological studies and confrontations
with his professors, 2. He studied philosophy mostly under two very different
specialists: Roscelin of Compiegne (a nominalist) and Guillaume de
Champeaux (a realist), and disagreed with each of them rather
aggressively. Peter was always a very independent and original thinker and
interlocutor. He always looked for a more inclusive and logically superior
solution than those immediately available. I understand that this biographical
information does not present a demonstrative proof, but rather a background with
which Weinberg’s and Broadie’s pictures just do not blend well, and upon which
I would try to draw a picture more plausible, i.e., that there was a third
position between realistic and nominalistic, namely, conceptualism,
which could be defined as a synthesis of realism (thesis) and nominalism
(antithesis), and which was precisely what Peter Abelard attempted to
establish.
II
It
was the claim of extreme nominalists that the names were just sounds, that we
could call one and the same thing quite opposite names, and it would not change
anything in its essence. It very well can be so, but in the naming things we
also do something to ourselves, to our understanding of the physical
nature of the things. Is there really man or woman, masterpiece,
junk, good guy, bad guy, traitor, falsifier, guilty, innocent? Or all those
words are just “utterances”? Is there some reality behind the word mother,
or John can be your mother if the court rules so? Abelard understood that there
is some medium between things and names which is not the name and
not the thing it signifies, and still to keep the language meaningful we must
use certain words which point to that medium in order to form
meaningful concepts in our minds. Without this physics would not be possible as
well as any science and language itself. That is because of that medium it is
possible to translate from one language to another. Without this there would be
no dictionaries, and to understand Greek or Latin would be impossible. If you
call a nominalist a genius, he will be pleased, and if you call him a
fool he will likely to get offended. But why, if it is true what he is
teaching? Words do signify something about physical world! The words we use to
describe physical objects are symbols of meaningful concepts which we form
about those things in our minds. They are mental in nature, but they necessarily
belong to those particulars. For Abelard this was easy to see and
demonstrate. But what about the names which do not point to particulars? There
were three questions, which Peter Abelard and Porphyry before him asked: (1)
whether genera and species subsist or are placed only in understanding; (2) if
they subsist, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; (3) whether they are
separated from sensibles or are placed in sensibles. Also there was the forth question
added by Abelard, whether genera and species must refer to something or
whether, if their normal referents are destroyed, these universals could
consist of mere meaning of the concept.
III
The
next quotation from Abelard will shed more light on the nature of the problem
of how to understand universals, because there were different opinions
about that, and also expose Abelard’s perception of Plato-Aristotle controversy
and whether it was really a controversy:
Boethius likewise
[Porphyry], when he says that the thought collected from the likeness of
many things is genus or species*, seems to have understood the same common
conception. Some insist that Plato was of this opinion too, namely that
he called those common ideas which he places in nous, genera and
species. Boethius records that he dissented from Aristotle when he says
that Plato wanted genera and species and the others not only to be
understood universals, but also to be and to subsist without bodies, as if
to say that he understood as universals those common conceptions which he set
up separated from bodies in nous, not perhaps taking the universal as
the common predication, as Aristotle does, but rather as common
likeness of many things. For that latter conception seems in no wise to
be predicated of many as a noun is which is adapted singly to many.
That he
says Plato thinks universals subsist without sensibles, can be resolved in
another manner so that there is no disagreement in the opinions of the
philosophers. For what Aristotle says to the effect that universals
always subsist in sensibles, he said only in regard to actuality,
because obviously the nature which is animal which is designated by universal
name and which according to this is called universal by a certain transference,
is never found in actuality except in a sensible thing, but Plato thinks
that it so subsists in itself naturally that it would retain its being when not
subjected to sense, and according to this the natural being is called by the
universal name. That, consequently, which Aristotle denies with respect to
actuality, Plato, the investigator of physics, assigns to natural
aptitude, and thus there is no disagreement between them (H&W,183).
It
likely follows from this that Abelard (in his search of the proper definition
for universals and examining the opinions of Porphyry, Boethius, and more importantly
Aristotle and Plato) is trying to see the possibility of truth in each
position, if it is presented in accordance to the meaning of each philosopher -
truth does not contradict truth. But even so, he investigates the
problem further reviewing a more recent (nominalistic) position, which he
modifies, because by itself it does not look reasonable enough to
him:
Moreover, now
that authorities have been advanced who seem to build up by universal
words common concepts which are to be called forms, reason too
seems to assent. For what else is it to conceive forms by nouns than to
signify by nouns? But certainly since we make forms diverse from understanding,
there arises now besides thing and understanding a third thing which is the
signification of nouns. Although authority does not hold this, it is
nevertheless not contrary to reason.
Let us
then set forth what we promised above to define, namely, whatever the community
of universal words is considered to be because of a common cause of imposition
or because of a common conception or because of both . There is nothing
to prevent that it be because of both, but the common cause which is taken
in accordance of nature of things seems to have greater force (183).
_______________________________________________________________________________
*It
feels that I have to apologize to the reader for my underlining of certain
words and phrases. It may be useless and disturbing for him providing that his
knowledge of Abelard is flawless, but it is important for the clarity of my own
understanding of the text, and also can help the reader to understand what
particularly is important to me. (A. K. )
The nature of things, and
not the words only, is something that has to be of greater
Likewise we
must define . . . that the conceptions of universals are formed by
abstraction, and we must indicate how we may speak of them alone, naked
and pure but not empty (183).
Here I would
like to remind the reader the Aristotelian doctrine of intellect-matter.
According to it, there are two types of intellect: potential and active; we
have knowledge of something when we abstract the portion of that potentiality
by active intellect: the matter is the principle of potentiality (unknown). Let
us see now how Abelard deals with abstraction:
In relation to
abstraction it must be known that matter and form always subsist mixed
together, but the reason of the mind has this power, that it may now consider
matter by itself; it may now turn its attention to form alone; it may now
conceive both intermingled. The two first processes, of course, are by
abstraction; they abstract something from things conjoined that they may
consider its very nature. But the third process is by conjunction. For
example, the substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and invested
in infinite forms; when I turn my attention to this in the material
essence of the substance, after having circumscribed all forms, I have a
concept by a process of abstraction. Again when I consider only corporeity in
it, which I join to substance, that concept likewise (although it is by
conjunction with respect to the first, which considered only the nature of
substance) is formed also by abstraction with respect to other forms than
corporeity, none of which I consider, such as animation, sensuality, rationality,
whiteness.
Conceptions
of this sort through abstraction seemed perhaps false and vain for this reason,
that they perceive the thing otherwise than it subsists. For since they are
concerned with matter by itself or form separately, and since none the less
neither of these subsists separately, they seem obviously to conceive the thing
otherwise than it is, and therefore to be empty. But this is not so
(184).
Abstraction in
any case is not empty for Abelard because it considers “the qualities the
nature has” even though it does “not consider all that it has“. When
he considers “only this one among the qualities the nature has the only
refers to the attention alone, not to the mode of subsisting”.
This process on one hand could be understood to be arbitrary (because we could
choose where to point our attention), but on the other hand it is restricted
by the nature of things necessarily, and in the second sense is realistic. “Otherwise
it would not be reason, but opinion, that is if the understanding should deviate
from the state of the thing”( 184). So, the concept formed in the mind by
abstraction is a realistic one. But it is always limited always considering
only part of the nature of the thing.
There
is room to think that the abstraction is not the only way how we get the
realistic concepts of the world of physics. Abelard is a monk and a theologian,
and not just a natural philosopher. He definitely believes in God, Supreme
Intellect and Providence, miracles and prophets. How is it possible to have
knowledge of things before they actually exist? It is not by way of
abstraction. The ideas of things and their relations should be able to exist
before the very things exist, otherwise prophecies would not be possible. In
his writings on universals Abelard does not go too far to investigate this, but
there are passages, suggesting that the problem entered his mind in a peculiar
form:
But the
following question arises concerning the providence of the artist,
whether it is empty when he holds in mind the form of a work still future,
seeing that the thing is not yet constituted so. But if we grant that, we are
forced to say that likewise the providence of God is empty, which he had before
the creation of his work . . . Consequently, modifying the words we should say
that the providence is not empty…(185)
Abelard
promises: “There will be a fuller investigation of this in relation to the on
Interpretation”, but he also says: “any question concerning the
understanding with respect to God is superfluous”, and in the regular case of
our knowledge he returns “to the conception of universals which must
always be formed by abstraction” (185). But what is the nature of this
abstraction compare to the abstraction of the concept of things?
When I hear
man or whiteness or white I do not recall from the
meaning of the noun all the natures or properties which are in
the subject things, but from man I have only the conception although
confused, not discrete, of animal and rational mortal, but not of the later
accidents as well. For the conceptions of individuals, too, are formed by
abstraction, when namely it is said: this substance, this body, this animal,
this man, this whiteness, this white. For by this man I consider only
the nature of man but related to a certain subject, whereas by man I
consider that same nature simply in itself not related to anyone.
Wherefore the understanding of universals is rightly spoken of as alone
and naked and pure, that is, alone in regard to the senses,
because it does not perceive the thing as sensual, and naked in regard to
the abstraction of all and any forms, and pure with respect to
discreteness because no thing whether it be matter or form, is
designated in it; in this latter respect we called a conception of this
sort confused above (186).
So, according to
Abelard, we should understand universals as neither things no merely words,
also he does not grant them the status of forms (which makes his position
neither realistic no nominalistic!). They constitute a special class of confused
but real concepts, which are also useful in our thinking of the natural world
and our intellect as well.
IV
After
having shown the nature of the universals Abelard proceeds to the resolution of
the questions concerning genera and species:
The
first question, then, was to this effect, whether genera and species
subsist, that is signify something truly existent, or are placed in
understanding alone, etc., that is, are located in empty opinion without the
thing, like the following words, chimera and goat-stag which do not give rise
to a rational understanding.
To this
it must be replied that in truth they signify by nomination things truly
existent, to wit, the same things as singular nouns, and in no wise are
they located in empty opinion; nevertheless, they consist in a certain
sense in the understanding alone and naked and pure, as has been
determined.
(2)
…whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, that is when they are
considered to signify subsistences whether they signify subsistences which are
corporeal or incorporeal. . . . I see that the existing things some are called
corporeal and others incorporeal, which of these shall we say are the things
signified by universals? To which the reply is made: in a certain sense
corporeal things, that is things discrete in their essence and incorporeal with
respect to the designation of the universal noun because obviously universals
do not name discretely and determinately, but confusedly, as we have set forth
sufficiently above. Whence the universal names themselves are called
both corporeal with respect to the nature of things and incorporeal with
respect to the manner of signification, because although they name things which
are discrete, nevertheless they do not name them discretely and determinately.
(3)
…whether they are placed in sensibles, etc., follows from granting that they
are incorporeal, because obviously the incorporeal taken in a certain
manner is divided by being and by not being in the sensible . . . . And
universals are said to subsist in sensibles, that is to signify the
intrinsic substance existing in a thing which is sensible by its exterior
forms, and although they signify this substance which subsists
actually in the sensible thing, yet they demonstrate the same substance
naturally separated from the sensible thing, as we determined above in relation
to Plato. Wherefore Boethius says that genera and species are understood,
but are not, outside sensible things, in that obviously the
things of genera and species are considered with respect to their nature
rationally in themselves even when the exterior forms by which they come to
the senses have been removed. . . . obviously they do not designate the
sensible things which they name in the same manner as they are perceived, that
is as discrete, and sense does not discover them by demonstration of them, it
remained a question whether universals named sensible things only or whether
they also signified something else; to which it is replied that they signify
both sensible things and at the same time that common conception
which Priscian ascribes particularly to the divine mind.
And
in accord with them. With respect to that which we understand here as the fourth
question , as we noted above, the following is the solution, that we in
no wise hold that universal nouns are, when, their things having been
destroyed, they are not predicable of many things inasmuch as they are not
common to any things, as for example the name of the rose when there are no
longer roses, but it would still, nevertheless, be significative by the
understanding, although it would lack nomination; otherwise there
would not be the proposition: there is no rose (187).
Here we can note
that Abelard’s answers are extremely sharp, flexible and inclusive. He
concentrates on the different meanings in which the universals are applied and
understood. He always keeps in mind the physical reality they refer to. He also
states that they could be significative even without nomination. And this is,
in my opinion, a very strong claim (among others mentioned above) against those
who would like to call his solution a nominalistic one. Names, and universal
names particularly, are not just mere “utterances”, because they signify being
and not being of something in the physical world.
It must be
noted, however, that although the definition of the universal or of the genus
or the species includes only words, nevertheless these nouns are often
transferred to their things, as when it is said that species is made up of
genus and difference, that is, the thing of the species from the thing of the
genus. For when the nature of words is examined with respect of
signification, it is a question sometimes of words and sometimes of things,
and frequently the names of the latter and the former are transferred
reciprocally (188).
For this
reason most of all, the ambiguous treatment of logic as well as grammar leads
many, who do not distinguish clearly and properly of the imposition of nouns or
the abuse of transference, into error by the transference of nouns (188).
He wants us
always to make sense or signify either things or words and understand what is
that we are doing at the moment.
Now,
I think, it is clear that there was a problem of universals at the time,
otherwise there would be no alternative questions and attempted solutions about
them. It seems that Abelard’s solution was neither nominalistic, no realistic. He
tried to give life of a meaningful concept to the universals, saying that they
signify by nomination things truly existent, and some say he succeeded for
another 300 years in his conceptualism. There is a reason why Abelard was not a
peripatetic (meaning the follower of Aristotle). He could not, being a
Christian theologian and the observer of Plato, considering his position with
qualification (together with Boethius), but like almost every medieval thinker
he was indebted to The Philosopher, which did not prevent him from being a very
original thinker with rather synthetic tendencies.
V
What
consequences of Abelard’s writings on universals could be thought of? The doctrine
that names for physical things and for their groups of certain kind, like
genera and species, and universals in general, at least some times are real,
i.e., constitute a valid knowledge about the physical world as well as at other
times the knowledge about the operations of our mind, influenced the further
development of natural philosophy and logic in Western tradition. The subtle
and multiple-level solution of the problem encouraged a more elaborated and
keen approach to the other problems of philosophy as well. The philosophers,
like for instance Tomas Aquinas, were greatly impressed by Peter Abelard’s work
and they used his solution in their writings. I believe that later even
Immanuel Kant was indebted to Abelard building his arguments about necessity
intrinsic to science, which was, in my opinion, the strongest part in proving his
Transcendental
Aesthetic, namely how are synthetic a priori propositions possible.
We can trace Abelard’s logical ideas in Kant’s writings on logic.
Who
knows how much F. Bacon was in his debt, when he so passionately believed in
the new method for acquiring knowledge of the physical world? It is easy to
underestimate Abelard’s importance for the whole development of Western
science, if we fail to consider that his doctrine was not a nominalistic one,
which I hope I was able to demonstrate in this essay.
VI
There still remains a question: Why some
scholars like Weinberg and Broadie called Abelard’s solution nominalistic? In
order to answer this, let us first look at their definitions of the term nominalism
and then on some of their explanation of what Abelard wrote on the universals.
Nominalism traditionally understood is a doctrine, which
denies the real existence of universals, conceived as supposed referents of
general terms like “red” or “table”. . . . In more recent usage, ‘nominalism’
is often employed as a label for any repudiation of abstract entities, whether
universals or particulars…(O.C.P., p.624)
In contrast to that, The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy gives us the following on the term realism:
‘Real’ is often used with some opposite term in mind, such
as ‘ideal’ or ‘fake’. To assert that something is somehow mind-independent is to
move in the realist direction… (647)
Abelard thinks that nouns can be real and fake, or
empty. When we speak of genera and species “they signify by
nomination things truly existent, to wit, the same things as
singular nouns, and in no wise are they located in empty opinion”,
when we speak of mere words and images “like the following words, chimera and
goat-stag which do not give rise to a rational understanding” those are located
in empty opinion without the thing.
So,
if somebody would focus exclusively on the second kind of words in Abelard’s
solution, it would seem to him that Peter is a nominalist. Which I believe is
the case with Weinberg and Broadie. It is possible then to form the concept of
universal fakes like unicorns, centaurs… and call them empty species. It would
be fine if Abelard did not also emphasize the first kind of words, which in
no wise are located in empty opinion. If we focus exclusively on this kind
of words we could (with the same right!) call Abelard a realist, and his
solution of the problem of the universal a realistic one. But the truth is that
there are two and not only one type of words Abelard shows, that is why his
solution must be called rather synthetic, and the word is conceptualism.
Abelard learned from both of his teachers and not just from one of them, and he
was a very attentive student!
J. Weinberg and A. Broadie: some account of the arguments they
give for their claim.
Broadie says: “In the
dispute about the nature of the universals he [Abelard] was in the nominalist
camp, holding that universals are utterances (voces) or mental terms,
not things in the real world”.
This is far from precision, as I already showed giving a
much more inclusive Abelard’s quotations about universals. Once more, Abelard’s
universals are mental terms (like all terms), but they are sometimes about real
things in the real world.
Broadie: “The universality of the universal
derives from the fact that it is predicable of many things. Nevertheless,
unless a number of things are in the same state, the one universal term cannot
be predicated of them”.
Let’s read it as: unless many things are in the
same state…we cannot call them by the name signifying that state. It is
applicable, for instance, to the state of existing, and Abelard is saying: “we
in no wise hold that universal nouns are, when, their things having been
destroyed, they are not predicable of many things inasmuch as they are not
common to any things, as for example the name of the rose when there are no
longer roses, but it would still, nevertheless, be significative by the
understanding, although it would lack nomination; otherwise there
would not be the proposition: there is no rose”. Here the physical roses do not
exist but the meaningful concept of roses, the universal, does, but in the mind
only. This is only one of the cases of universals, and even in this case the
name roses is not empty. It is not exactly the same to say there is
no rose in the vase as there is no unicorn in the room. Because we
observe real roses in other times and places in the physical world, but nobody
really observes unicorns in reality. Abelard shows the possibility to talk
about real things, and then universals describing them have certain
reality, he also shows the possibility to predicate unreal things only existing
in the mind, in that case they will certainly not have real existence. Still,
in both cases they will have the existence as mental concepts. So some concepts
could signify real things of physics and others could exist without physical
referents. It is just when we talk about the second type of Abelard’s names we
could consider him “in the nominalist camp”. But
how in the world could we do that considering his other types?
J.
Weinberg says: “His [Abelard’s] nominalistic solution of the problem of
universals requires him to deny that universals are things and to affirm that
they are significant words or concepts merely, and he finds a problem in the
existence of a significant term which has no normal extradiscursive referent”
(79). I can answer that the terms merely and significant present
a contradiction. If a word is merely a word it is empty. If the word signifies
something it has certain physical reality, and not merely a word. Therefore the
above attempt to identify Abelard’s solution, in my opinion, lacks discretion
and presents a logical problem. About the normal referent I can say that
Abelard shows different cases (which I already exposed above) in which there
sometimes are physical referents and at other times there are no physical
referents. Hence, it is better to say that Abelard’s solution is
neither nominalistic no realistic but rather synthetic with qualifications, which
I already did in this essay.
But what if the following questions still come
to our mind?
3. are they stressing other texts, or are they not
convinced that my reading of Abelard’s texts is correct?
Personally, I respect scholarship in general,
and first would consult specialists on any topic of their expertise and only
then would try my own reasoning wanting it to be informed and inclusive.
However, the problem with so-called specialists often arises: not all
philosophers concentrate on certain problematic phenomena, and, having had
focusing on particular areas of the history of thought and doing a really good
job there, sometimes they treat other areas without proper discretion. If it
were not so, we would not have to think for ourselves at all but just to
memorize what some specialist have said. We would not even have to read the
originals. It is after reading the Abelard’s original writings with particular
interest and sympathy I was surprised to read those statements of
Broadie and Weinberg, which seemed to me contradicting my understanding of
Abelard. I have to say that it is not that everything they wrote on
Abelard was not helpful, on the contrary, I liked reading them, especially
Weinberg.
Now, about the questions themselves. It seems
to me that there is a temptation (1) to call Abelard a
nominalist, because nominalism is one of the foundations of his
solution. As I already said, probably those writers thought it was good enough
to use the term for this reason. We also often call the snow white when it is
white only partially, like today. I do not know if we should be called silly for this (2), but I do think that the snow right after the
snow-storm would be called white more properly then today. And compare to that
the latter should be more properly called dirty-white or something like
that. About other texts Weinberg stresses, I just went through those again (in
S.H.M.P.) with this particular question in mind, noticed the exposition of
Abelard’s critical attitude to both, realistic Guillaume de Champeaux and nominalistic Roscelin of Compiegne, (and also
others), nevertheless I could not find any relative argument which could
present a contradiction to my reading of Abelard on this matter. There could be
appearances of justification of that claim but I just can’t see anything really
strong. That is why I will show only a couple of examples:
“The universal is that which in naturally apt to be
predicated of many” (p.82). This rather supports the realistic element
of the Abelard’s doctrine. If, what ever it is, a universal is naturally
apt to be predicated of particulars, it has certain physical reality and cannot
be empty. But then the critique of a certain doctrine follows, and Abelard,
finds a flaw in that particular doctrine of collection of particulars.
This critique still is not directed against the realism of universal
itself but against the notion of universal as a collection-term for the
particulars, which does not support the Weinberg’s claim we are investigating.
What than about the following?
“While the motivation of this theory (Adelard of Bath’s) is clearly the
attempt to locate universality in individual things, it fails in the attempt to
predicate a thing of a thing” (p. 83).
This
also criticizes not a reality of a universal in general, but rather a particular
doctrine designed for such purpose. And so in all other cases shown by Weinberg,
as far as I can judge. So, after another examination of the texts, I cannot see
anything to compromise my position. I do not think
that they are stressing other texts (3), relative to the essence of my
claim. About whether they are convinced that my reading of Abelard’s texts
is correct, I cannot actually say unless I ask Weinberg and Broadie and they
choose to respond to my critique.
Still,
if the reader can see something I keep missing, I would be obliged if he
brought it to my attention, and until then I remain satisfied with my
conclusion which consists of the following:
The
Abelards solution of the problem of universals is neither a realistic no a
nominalistic one, or, in other words, it is in the same degree nominalistic as
it is realistic; it includes elements of both as well as a critique of both
taken separately in their application to the totality of the question. Neither
one by itself can deal with all cases Abelard has exposed, because it is the
meaning of the words in their relationship with the classes of particulars
which determines their real or only nominal usage appropriate in each case, and
that is determined sometimes by the mind only and sometimes by the nature of
those particulars as well. The proper usage of logic here requires great
attention and care in the construction of a meaningful concept. That is why it
is better to call Abelard’s solution conceptualism, and the word here signifies
a combination or synthesis of realism and nominalism.
Bibliography
- Hyman and
Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Hackett Publishing Co.,
Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1973.
- J. R.
Weinberg, Short History of Medieval Philosophy, Princeton University
Press, 1991.
- The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy, edited by T. Honderich, Oxford University Press,
1995.
- Britannica,v.
I , Chicago 1997.